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A TALE OF TWO COURTS: THE 'CREATION' OF A 
JURISDICTION? 
Elizabeth Chadwick * 
/ asked at The Hague, and again al Paris, whether it was really necessary thai a terrible 
war should take place before a criminal Court could be constituted, or that some crime 
which shocked the civilised world should be committed, before such a Court can be set 
up. 
H.E. Megalos Caloyanni' 
ABSTRACT 
Two projects to create the international criminal courts were devised during the 20th 
century. On 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered 
into force. On 16 November 1937, the Convention for the Creation of an International 
Criminal Court was opened for signature at Geneva. The latter never entered into force, 
an event made contingent on the coining into force of its companion Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which also never occurred. The use to be 
made of law in each court forms the core of this discussion: the Rome Statute Court will 
rely on both vertical and horizontal approaches to the exercise of jurisdiction, and will 
utilise a harmonised approach to substantive criminal law; the 1937 court would have 
utilised domestic criminal law, in that the intent behind the 1937 convention was to make 
available an alternate forum, should the need arise. It is argued in particular mat a hori-
zontal approach to international criminal law may hold more seeds of future discord 
than a vertical approach, as harmonised law-making and enforcement lack a much-
needed critical foundation. Crucially, the new International Criminal Court could greatly 
disturb the existing distribution of power and authority originally designed into the 
United Nations Charter, and effect a major shift in power politics, thus upsetting the 
balance between the principle of non-interference in state domestic affairs and the main-
tenance of international peace. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
O n 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court ( I C C ) 
entered into force.2 Adopted , and opened for signature i n R o m e on 17 July 1998, 
Senior Lecturer, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, U K . 
H . E . M . Caloyanni, T h e Proposals of M . Laval to the League of Nations for the 
Establishment of an International Permanent Tribunal in Criminal Matters: Lecture to the 
Grotius Society, 4 July 1935' (1935) 21 Grotius Transactions 77,86. 
U N doe. A / C O N F . 183/9 (17 July 1998), reprinted (1998) 37 I L M 1002. Sixty ratifications 
were needed for the ICC to come into force. ICC, article 126. A s of 5 September 2003,91 
states had ratified. The ICC is not an organ of the United Nations, although the two 
organizations will have formal relations. ICC, article 2. 
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this was a historic event for many reasons.3 The jurisdiction of the ICC is to extend, 
as stated in article 5, to 'the most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole': crimes against humanity, and of genocide, war, and aggression.4 
The ICC is the culmination of a project commenced soon after the Second World 
War,5 and hopes for its future success and ultimate effectiveness run high. 
Nonetheless, concrete efforts to achieve consensus with regard to an inter-
national criminal court did not begin so recently. A much earlier attempt at con-
sensus was the opening for signature and ratification in 1937 of the Convention for 
the Creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC 37).6 The subject matter juris-
diction of the ICC 37 was limited to 'terrorism', in the wide sense of 'making 
progress in the struggle against offences of an international character',7 and the 
'repression of conspiracies or crimes committed with a political or terrorist 
purpose'.8 Unfortunately, the ICC 37 never entered into force,' an event made con-
tingent on the coming into force of its companion Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Terrorism (Terrorism Convention) which also never occurred.10 
Had these instruments done so, however, a new international jurisdiction would 
effectively have been created. 
Today's ICC also entails what could be viewed as a new jurisdiction, one resting 
on a body of international criminal law which has only recently been acknowledged 
3
 See, e.g., M.-C. Roberge, 'The New International Criminal Court: A Preliminary 
Assessment' (December 1998) 325IRRC 671; I. Tallgren, "Completing the "International 
Criminal Order"' (1998) 67 Nordic JIL 107; P. Sob, "The Dynamics of International 
Criminal Tribunals', ibid., 139; 'Colloquium' (1998) 3 Journal of Armed Conflict Law. 
4
 Regarding the crime of aggression, see below notes 45, and 159-160, and accompanying 
text. 
5
 The United Nations General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to study 
the possibility of establishing an international tribunal, through which jurisdiction over 
certain convention crimes, such as genocide, could be exercised. See UNGA Resolution 
260(III)B, UN doc. A/760 (1948), reprinted (1949) UNYB 959, 960; P. Bouzat, 
'Introduction', in M.C. Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute 
for an International Criminal Tribunal (1987) xiii. 
6
 League of Nations Document, G547(I).M.384(I).1937.V., reprinted 7 Hudson, 
International Legislation, No. 500,878; opened for signature 16 November 1937. See, e.g.. 
Editorial Comment, Hudson, 'The Proposed International Criminal Court' (1938) 32 
AJIL 549; Notes, Starke, 'The Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal 
Court' (1938) 19 BYIL 216; A . Sottile, 'Le Terrorisme International' (1938) 65 Recueildes 
Cours 91,139-178; United Nations Secretary-General, 'Historical Survey of the Question 
of International Criminal Jurisdiction', UN doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949) at 16-18 
(Historical Survey). 
7
 Preamble to the ICC 37. 
8
 Resolution IV of the League of Nations Council, quoted in Caloyanni, loc. tit., 80-81; 
Sottile, loc. tit., 143. 
9
 As of 1 January 1941, no state had ratified the ICC 37. 
10
 League of Nations Document, C.546(I).M.383(I).1937.V., reprinted 7 Hudson, 
International Legislation, No. 499, 863; opened for signature 16 November 1937. The 
Terrorism Convention was to come into force ninety days after the deposit of three 
ratifications or accessions. Article 26(1)(2). Only those states which ratified or acceded to 
the Terrorism Convention could ratify or accede to the ICC 37. As of 1 January 1941, India 
alone had ratified the Terrorism Convention. Editor's Notes, 7 Hudson, International 
Legislation, ibid., 862,878. 
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to exist.11 As such, the new court is reliant on the somewhat contentious notion 
that an international legal community, one imbued with a degree of autonomous 
sovereign force, exists. This, in turn, implies that an aggregation of individual state 
wills is capable of co-ordinated action. Somewhat more contentiously, the ICC is to 
apply a harmonised law to criminal acts. Heretofore, acts deemed 'criminal', if pro-
hibited at all, have been so under disparate national laws,12 even though a strong 
bias towards Western ideals is indeed increasingly apparent within the many social-
structural frameworks of domestic criminal law. While a harmonised approach to 
criminal law has led to some apprehension that, in time, a majority of states could 
validly and authoritatively bind the minority,13 the growing importance of measures 
such as procedural fairness, equal protection norms, and rights of defence,14 do in 
fact imply a certain consensus may be emerging. 
In contrast, domestic criminal law would have been applied by the ICC 37. The 
intent behind the convention was to make available an alternate forum, should the 
need arise. The associated 1937 Terrorism Convention was merely a treaty to 
conform the prohibition of political terrorism. In turn, the vertical approach to 
jurisdiction adopted in the ICC 37 was reflective of the long-standing tradition of 
prosecuting crime in cases where there exists a sovereign or territorial link, the 
breaking of which by an enforcing state in order to reach international criminals 
can be a valuable tool of international justice.15 Thus, even though the social-
structural origins, and consequences, of criminal law often differ on a state-by-state 
basis,16 a consistency in substantive principle would have been possible in each case. 
11
 See, e.g„ C.J.M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (2001) 35-44, 
who characterises international criminal law as 'human rights-centric'. See also ICC, 
article 21(3). 
12
 The definition of genocide, ICC, article 6, was taken from the 1948 Genocide Convention, 
which contemplated both international criminality and an international court in which to 
try the offence. No nexus to an armed conflict is required for crimes against humanity. 
ICC, article 7. Contrast practice in this regard under the Nuremberg Charter, see note 66 
below, article 6(c), and Indictment Count 4. Jurisdiction over serious war crimes, ICC, 
article 8, is largely based on relevant provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
and two Protocols of 1977. 
13
 Of interest see C. Douzinas, 'Postmodern Just Wars: Kosovo, Afghanistan and the New 
World Order', working paper in possession of the author. 
" A. Woodiwiss, Making Human Rights Work Globally (2003) 15. 
15
 For example, a theory of universal jurisdiction may be applied, via national criminal 
jurisdiction, for war crimes or piracy, because of general enforcement obligations. M.C. 
Bassiouni, "Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice' (2001) 42 Virg. JIL 81, 101 n.70, 118. Contrast G. Tremlett, 
'Spanish PM refuses torture extradition', The Saturday Guardian, 30 August 2003, 18 
(judicial request to extradite 40 Argentinian torturers to Spain prevented by the 
government). 
16
 See, e.g., H. Kelsen, 77ie Communist Theory of Law (1976,1955) 102; C Silverman, 'An 
Appeal to the U.N.: Terrorism Must Come Within the Jurisdiction of an International 
Criminal Court' (1997) at <gopher//gopher.igc.apc.org/00/orgs/icc/ngodocs/terrorism_ 
Silverman.txt> (a comparison of US, Iranian, and Cuban criminal justice systems in 
relation to air piracy and hijacking). But see A . Stille, 'Historians Trace an Unholy 
Alliance: Religion and Nationalism', NYTimes.com, 31 May 2003. 
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rising from within the organic base17 of each signatory state's particular political 
philosophy.'8 
Accordingly, it is a matter of concern that the ICC will rely on both vertical and 
horizontal approaches to the exercise of jurisdiction,19 as the construction of a har-
monised law with which to prosecute the nominated crimes may mask what is in 
effect a political and philosophical 'hijacking' of international crime control by 
special interests.30 The inherent instability of interaction between the political 
aspects of state sovereignty and a notional international legal community also raises 
a danger that an 'autonomous' body of international criminal law will result in 
inconsistency.21 While the ICCs of 1937 and 1998 thus constitute very different 
approaches to an age-old problem, namely the difficulty of making 'criminal' some 
uses of force in international life, it is the purpose of this discussion to explore 
briefly the use of law made through each court initiative. This is done in order to 
introduce the theme that a horizontal approach to the enforcement of international 
law may hold more seeds of future discord than a vertical approach which relies on 
individual state respect for treaty obligations. 
The structure of this discussion is as follows. First, the structure of the ICC 37 
is outhned, after which the provisions highlighted are contrasted with the relevant 
provisions of the present ICC. The origins and purpose of each court project are 
then outlined in order to locate within the prevailing legal and political environ-
ment the respective merits of a vertical versus a horizontal approach to inter-
national criminal jurisdiction. 
2 A COMPARISON: T H E INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS O F 1937 A N D 1998 
The ICCs of 1937 and 1998 are obviously different, if only in regards to their respec-
tive lengths. The ICC 37, as a tribunal dependent on the coming into force of the 
Terrorism Convention, extends to a mere 56 articles.22 The present ICC, a much 
more ambitious project in terms both of jurisdiction, procedure and detail, extends 
17
 By which is meant the foundation to natural, systematic growth rather than mere historical 
development. See L. Oppenheim, The League of Nations and Its Problems (1919) 5,10-14. 
18
 But see S. Sedley, 'No More Victors Justice?', London Review of Books, 2 January 2003,14. 
19
 ICC, article 13. See notes 46-51 and 68-70, below and accompanying text. See generality 
section 4, below. 
M
 The Statute is a heavily compromised document For example, the Vatican, Catholic and 
Islamic states exerted pressure to limit to heterosexuals the article 7 proscription of 
persecution on grounds of gender. Sedley, loc. tit., 16. See also Oppenheim, op. tit., 44, 
para. XII. 
21
 Which is a different issue to the sovereignty problem in relation to human rights, in that 
human rights limit the enforcement of human rights. Safferling, op. tit., 48. 
n
 The ICC 37, when combined with the Terrorism Convention on which it was dependent, 
extends to 85 articles. 
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to 128 articles. Moreover, the two tribunals are strikingly different in terms of struc-
ture, scope of jurisdiction, and choice of law. 
2.1 Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility: The ICC of 1937 
Commentary in 1933 indicates that, as 'the rules of international law concerning the 
repression of terrorist activity are not at present sufficiently precise to guarantee 
efficiently international co-operation in the matter',25 primary attention should be 
focused on proscribing certain offences.24 A French initiative, the ICC 37 required 
states to retain control over terrorist prosecutions. Seizing the ICC 37 was merely 
an option: each High Contracting Party 'shall be entitled, instead of prosecuting 
before [its] own courts, to commit the accused for trial to the Court'.25 Thus, a 
referring High Contracting Party had to ratify both the Terrorism Convention and 
the ICC 37, have competence either to prosecute or extradite,26 and choose to 
delegate its competence to the ICC.27 In turn, the ICC 37 would sit 'only when it 
is seized of proceedings for an offence within its jurisdiction'.28 It was to be a per-
manent body at The Hague,29 and was to establish its own regulations regarding 
practice and procedure.30 
Article 1(2) of the Terrorism Convention defines 'acts of terrorism' as: 
Criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a 
state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or 
the general public. 
Articles 2 and 3 provide for jurisdiction rations materiae: an act of terrorism of an 
international character was committed on the territory of one High Contracting 
Party, and directed against another. Article 2 of the Terrorism Convention requires 
High Contracting Parties to make criminal the following acts: 
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall, if this has not already been done, 
make the following acts committed on his own territory criminal offences if 
they are directed against another High Contracting Party and if they consti-
tute acts of terrorism within the meaning of Article 1: 
13
 Resolution IV, quoted in Caloyanni, loc. dr. 
M
 Editorial Comment, Kuhn, 'International Co-operation in the Suppression of Crime* 
(1943) 2SAJIL 541,543. 
25
 Article 2(1). 
M
 Terrorism Convention, article 5, states, subject to national law, that 'each High 
Contracting Party shall provide the same punishment for the acts set out in Articles 2 and 
3,...'. 
27
 Sottile,/oc dr., 151. 
78
 ICC 37, article 3. This would occur when a High Contracting Party committed an accused 
to the court for trial. Article 25(1). 
29
 Although it could meet elsewhere. ICC 37, article 4. 
M
 Article 15. 
76 Elizabeth Chadwick 
(1) Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to: 
(a) Heads of States, persons exercising the prerogatives of the head of the 
State, their hereditary or designated successors; 
(b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons; 
(c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public positions when 
the act is directed against them in their public capacity. 
(2) Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property devoted to 
a public purpose belonging to or subject to the authority of another High 
Contracting Party. 
(3) Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public. 
(4) Any attempt to commit an offence failing within the foregoing provisions of 
the present article. 
(5) The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms, ammunition, 
explosives or harmful substances with a view to the commission in 
any country whatsoever of an offence falling within the present article. 
Article 3 prohibits conspiracy or incitement, as follows: 
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall make the following acts criminal 
offences when they are committed on his own territory with a view to an act 
of terrorism falling within Article 2 and directed against another High Con-
tracting Party, whatever the country in which the act of terrorism is to be 
carried out: 
(1) Conspiracy to commit any such act; 
(2) Any incitement to any such act, if successful; 
(3) Direct public incitement to any act mentioned under heads (1), (2) or 
(3) of Article 2, whether the incitement be successful or not; 
(4) Wilful participation in any such act; 
(5) Assistance, knowingly given, towards the commission of any such act. 
Jurisdiction based on territoriality, nationality, and universality governed the option 
to cede a case to the ICC. Specifically, territorial jurisdiction exists should the offence 
be committed on the temtory of the referring High Contracting Party; grounds of 
nationality are contemplated should the perpetrators) of a terrorist offence abroad 
return to national territory. Finally, universal jurisdiction, as when a proscribed 
offence is committed abroad by a non-national, is inherent in the 'internationalising' 
of the article 2 offences specified in the Terrorism Convention.31 
31
 Sottile, he. cit., 149. See also 'The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 2001', 
reprinted (2001) 42 Virg. JIL at 157; Sedley, toe. cit., 16. 
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The court was to be available to any state which preferred not to deal directly with 
what might be a matter of some delicacy, making the ICC 37 highly progressive.32 
There was, however, no obligation on states to make use of the court, and no 'right* 
of an accused to be tried before it. As noted by Hudson,33 
The striking innovation in this Convention lies in the co-operation provided 
for to relieve States of embarrassing burdens cast upon them more or less 
accidentally and at the same time to assure to other States due regard for 
their special interest in repressing terrorist activities outside their own 
borders. 
2.2 Issues of Applicable Law: The ICC of 1937 
The ICC 37 carried no independent or superior function in terms of international 
law. The operation of the court was premised on the transposition of national 
criminal laws to the international plane, thus obviating any need to devise new law, 
as such.34 Article 19 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
. . . [Provided the offender is not allowed to escape punishment owing to 
an omission in the criminal law, the characterisation of the various 
offences . . . . the imposition of sentences, the methods of prosecution and 
trial, and the rules as to mitigating circumstances, pardon and amnesty are 
determined in each country by the provisions of domestic law. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Article 21 of the ICC 37 governs the choice of law as follows: 
(1) The substantive criminal law to be applied by the Court shall be that which 
is the least severe. In determining what that law is, the Court shall take into 
consideration the law of the territory on which the offence was committed 
and the law of the country which committed the accused to it for trial. 
(2) Any dispute as to what substantive criminal law is applicable shall be 
decided by the Court.35 
32
 Notes, Staike, loc. cit., 215. Articles 8,9, and 10, concern the duty to prosecute, or extradite 
an accused, for articles 2 and 3 offences. Articles 13 and 14 deal with municipal taw 
measures as to passports, firearms, and explosives. Articles 15,16, and 17 deal with inter-
state police co-operation, which, one commentator notes, was likely to be more effective 
in the prevention of terrorist outrages than strict municipal law reform. Provision for the 
resolution of inter-state disputes over jurisdiction and admissibility is made in ICC 37, 
articles 45 and 48. 
33
 Editorial Comment, Hudson, op. cit., 553-554. 
34
 See, e.g.. Notes, Starke, loc. cit., 217. 
35
 Article 22 provides that '[i]f the Court has to apply, in accordance with Article 21, the law 
of a state of which no sitting judge is a national, the Court may invite a jurist who is an 
acknowledged authority on such law to sit with it in a consultative capacity as a legal 
assessor'. 
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Thus, although the national laws of signatory states would have been bounded by 
articles 2 and 3 of the Terrorism Convention, and the prosecution of terrorist 
offences no longer solely a matter of sovereign discretion, much scope for variation 
remained. The principle of punishment, alone, was emphasised.36 The continued 
application of domestic criminal laws and enforcement procedures was to provide 
the backbone of this limited exercise in international co-operation, thereby reflect-
ing a more organic result in each case. Moreover, the use of domestic law before 
the court would have served to expose any gaps in a state's legal approach to ter-
rorist offences of an international character. 
Nonetheless, one commentator remarked in 1938 that the ICC 37 'is to be classi-
fied under the head of international criminal procedure',37 as post-referral pro-
cedures were specified in the convention. A case could be referred to the court only 
after the referring state had carried out its own investigations into the matter.38 Any 
state entitled to seize the court of a particular matter could inspect the file, and 
participate in the formal proceedings. Provision was also made for persons injured 
by an offence to constitute themselves as partie civiles before the court.39 Accused 
persons were to be legally represented, and informed of the case against them* 
Article 34 provides additional safeguards as follows: 
No examination, no hearing of witnesses or experts and no confrontation 
may take place before the Court except in the presence of the counsel for 
the accused and of the representatives of the States which are taking part in 
the proceedings or after these representatives have been duly summoned.41 
Witnesses could be summoned and heard. Proceedings were to be in public unless 
the court decided they should be held in camera. Deliberations were to be secret, 
but judgment pronounced publicly.'12 Decisions were to be by majority, and the 
reasoning stated.43 A judgement would have had international juridical effect 
between the High Contracting Parties. Sovereign states would thus have retained 
ultimate control over the suppression of politically-motivated terrorism having 
an international character, and the extent to which the court would be utilised. The 
ICC 37 provided an auxiliary forum in which to hear an already-prepared 
case, and perhaps more importantly, political distance from responsibility for the 
judgment.44 
36
 See section 3.3 note 126 below. 
37
 Notes, Starke, foe. cit., 217. 
38
 ICC 37, article 23. 
35
 Articles 26 and 39(2). In effect, this permitted representations as to damages. 
40
 Articles 29 and 30. 
41
 This provision did not prevent conviction in absentia. 
42
 Article 35. 
43
 Article 38. No provision is made for a written judgment. 
44
 Sottile, loc. cit., 159. 
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23 Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility: the 'Rome' ICC 
Except for the crime of aggression, the crimes listed in ICC, article 5, were in large 
part established or given definition as international crimes during, or immediately 
after, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals. For the ICC to have 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, however, article 5 must be amended, as 
follows: 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a pro-
vision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 denning the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdic-
tion with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.45 
Moreover, article 124 permits a state party to declare it does not accept the court's 
jurisdiction over war crimes for a period of seven years after entry into force of the 
statute for that state. As a result, the exercise of jurisdiction as envisaged appears 
somewhat piecemeal, as two of the four crimes listed in ICC, article 5, are made 
deferrable in terms of jurisdictional competence. 
Jurisdiction will also be differently privileged. ICC, Part 2, articles 5-21, cover 
jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law. Article 13 provides as follows: 
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
Article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: 
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been com-
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with 
Article 14; 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been com-
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or 
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in 
accordance with Article IS.46 
Bassiouni notes47 that the ICC does not establish universal jurisdiction in the 
context of state referrals under article 13(a), as the court is not intended to replace 
national jurisdiction over article 5 crimes. The present ICC is thus based on 'com-
plementarity', similar to the ICC 37; it was early recognised that the project would 
*
5
 ICC article 5(2). This means not before 2009. 
w
 See H . Smith, 'Athens Lawyers' Hague case names PM, Straw and Hoon', The Guardian, 
29 July 2003,11 (on 28 July 2003, the Athens Bar Association lodged a complaint with the 
Prosecutor alleging the perpetration of crimes against humanity and war crimes during the 
2003 Iraq War). 
47
 Bassiouni, loc at., 106. 
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founder if this were not the case.48 What is created is a universal scope to the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, leaving intact the verticality of state enforcement 
mechanisms. 
However, referrals by the U N Security Council do constitute the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, as they can transcend the territoriality of a state party-this is 
the horizontal aspect of the ICC's reach.49 There are no preconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction under article 13(b). The Security Council, acting by resolu-
tion adopted under chapter VII of the U N Charter, may also defer an investigation 
or prosecution for twelve months, renewable.50 Of perhaps greatest contrast to the 
ICC 37, however, are the provisions made in articles 34 and 42 for the office of 
the prosecutor as an organ of the court, and the power in article 13(c) for inde-
pendent prosecutorial initiative. Thus, should a state otherwise having jurisdiction 
be 'unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution', 
article 13(c) may come into operation.51 
2.4 Issues of Applicable Law: The 'Rome' ICC 
The creation and/or progressive development of an ascertainable, substantive body 
of international criminal law is one purpose behind the ICC. The Rome Statute 
provides for the adoption of the elements52 of the article 5 crimes, and rules of pro-
cedure and evidence,53 by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly 
of State Parties to the convention. Accordingly, the ICC was designed to promote 
a more 'unified' approach to the prosecution of article 5 crimes. Questions remain, 
however, as to whether the exposure of gaps in related domestic coverage will be 
rectified, as the system of 'complementarity' would seem to permit a degree of 
forum shopping. 
As regards the prioritisation of legal source, article 21 provides that the court 
is, first, to apply 'this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
48
 Preamble, and Article 1. See Current Developments (1996) 90 AJIL 496. Tallgren 
characterises 'complementarity' as 'sewing the Emperor's new clothes'. Tallgren, toe. cit, 
119, and 'Epilogue', 135-137. Sedley, ioc cit., 16, terms it 'subsidiarity', as 'the ICC is there 
only to do jobs that states themselves will not or cannot do'. The primacy of a national 
judicial system over its own citizens may still be asserted when the Prosecutor begins to 
look into a situation. ICC, articles 18(2) and 19(2)(b). As for competing requests by the 
court or a state for transfer of a 'wanted person', see Articles 90 and 94. 
49
 Bassiouni,he. cit., 106. 
50
 Article 16. The US, a non-ratifier, insisted deferral remain open to Prosecutorial 
review for six months. Article 18(3). See The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 
The International Criminal Court: The Case for U.S. Support', 8, at <gopher. 
igcapc.. .ngodocs/us&icc _Ichr.txt>. 
51
 See article 17. Article 18 governs preliminary rulings regarding admissibility, and article 
19 governs challenges to either jurisdiction, or admissibility. 
52
 Article 9. 'Elements of crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application 
of Articles 6,7, and 8'. Article 9(1). 
53
 ICC, article 51(1). The judges may remain flexible. Article 51(3). 
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Evidence', after which, and where appropriate, it is to apply applicable treaties and 
'the principles and rules of international law'.54 Any possible similarity with the ICC 
37 in this regard must await reference to article 21(l)(c), which provides in perti-
nent part as follows: 
Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national 
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws 
of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, 
The trial is governed by ICC, part 6. Article 63 mandates that the accused 'shall be 
present during the trial', unless his or her presence is disruptive, at which point the 
accused shall be permitted 'to observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside 
the courtroom'.55 Provisions governing procedural matters are extensive, and 
include choice of language(s) for use at trial, the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses (who are to receive protection), the production of documents and other 
evidence, the rights of the accused, the presumption of innocence, and the con-
ditions under which an accused may plead guilty.56 Proceedings are to be in public.57 
The judges must strive for unanimity, failing which a majority decision will be deter-
minative. Deliberations are to be in secret, but decisions, or their summary, deliv-
ered in writing in open court. Should a majority decision occur, the judgment 'shall 
contain the views of the majority and the minority'.58 Sentences are to be 'pro-
nounced in public and, wherever possible, in the presence of the accused'.59 
3 WHY AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 
3.1 General 
The issue of an international criminal court is completely separate to that of an 
international criminal jurisdiction.60 As for the latter, the U N Secretary-General 
submitted in 1949 a Memorandum to the General Assembly in which the question 
of international criminal jurisdiction is historically surveyed. It is noted that the 
best-known examples in customary international law of delicto juris gentium, or 
'crimes against the law of nations', are piracy, and war crimes.61 The recognition of 
54
 Part 3, articles 22-33, list genera! principles of criminal law. 
55
 Thus, no allowance is made for conviction in absentia. 
56
 ICC, part 6, articles 62-76. 
57
 Article 67(1). Provision is made for hearings in camera. Article 68(2). 
58
 Article 74. 
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these crimes permitted departures from the normal principles of domestic criminal 
jurisdiction. Other offences, dealt with through treaty, included the slave trade, the 
traffic in narcotics, women and children, the dissemination of obscene publications, 
the counterfeiting of currency, and the injury of submarine cables. 
As for the former issue - that of an international criminal court - important con-
siderations underlying the respective purposes of the 1937 and 1998 court projects 
reflect their era. Nonetheless, the impetus behind the two court projects is curiously 
similar the need to ensure the punishment of terrorist actors. The ICC 37 was 
designed to deal with terrorist offences of an international character, and resulted 
specifically from a spate of diplomatic assassinations and what might be termed on-
going 'anarchist' activity.62 The ICC project, although begun in the early days of the 
United Nations, largely stalled during the Cold War, and was renewed only after 
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe to deal, in part, with the perpetrators 
of acts of international terrorism.63 
In view of the sixty-odd years that separate them, a primary issue in the com-
parison of the two courts must be that of the law to be applied. The use of domestic 
law by the ICC 37, as a forum by default, would have reflected the basic premise 
that, in relation to crime, there was no international law.64 As states were viewed 
as the exclusive subjects of international rights and duties at that stage of inter-
national development, it no doubt was only possible to heighten the ceiling, if not 
raise the roof, of domestic state jurisdiction, through the creation of an 'inter-
national' criminal court which could afford a default forum. Moreover, the main 
emphasis was placed on the punishment of the perpetrators of certain offences, 
rather than on substantive or procedural uniformity. 
It should also be remembered that the assertion of universal jurisdiction 
remains a separate issue to universal condemnation.65 Since the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Military Tribunals,66 universality has been provided by treaty concerning 
62
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matters of general international concern, such as genocide.67 The present ICC rep-
resents a logical consequence of this trend, and further embodies a growing theme 
of the 20th century: as a minimum, individuals should enjoy the benefits, and accept 
the duties, of customary international law. This premise, in turn, flows from the 
doctrine 'that generally recognised rules of the law of nations form part of the law 
of the land'.68 There is thus, arguably, a continuing obligation on states to transform 
or transpose into their domestic spheres at least those rules of international law 
which are for the direct or indirect benefit of individuals, as well as to act in con-
formity with, in particular, customary international law, and any treaties to which 
they have assented. 
Nevertheless, the relative value of a vertical approach to enforcement, in terms 
of a prescriptive capability employed against international crime, quickly becomes 
apparent; heretofore in international life, 'the criminal jurisdiction exercised by a 
state within its territory [has been] the product of a long development whereby the 
state has gained sovereignty within that territory'.69 A vertical approach exposes 
gaps in the observance of the rights and duties imposed by international law, 
thereby, inter alia, encouraging the operation of the prosecute or extradite formula, 
mutual assistance in criminal matters, and general rules of interstate comity. The 
extra-territorial reach of national legislation may, in any event, overlap or coalesce 
with the enforcement of universal legislation to reach international crimes.70 
In contrast, a horizontally-harmonised approach to the definition of crime, to 
prosecution and procedure, and to sentencing, may conceal levels of dissonance 
over the particulars, such as those of interpretation. In other words, as the assign-
ment of a legal qualification to an act merely denotes the fact that subsequent 
assessments of responsibility and liability can be made, 'paper law', alone, is not 
enough. There is thus a real risk not only that the jurisdiction of the new court will 
be exercised erratically, but further, that what judgments it does produce could 
appear highly political, i f not politicised. In any event, the ICC has an extremely 
limited jurisdiction, and would thus represent a cautious exercise in harmonised 
law-making. Further, its competence should normally be restricted to the ratifying 
parties. 
However, to the extent that a horizontal approach to the exercise of jurisdiction 
over particular international crimes of violence represents something of an 
unknown in international life, it is of interest that a non-ratifying US remains 
67
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strongly opposed to its operation, primarily on the basis that the court's competence 
may not prove to be so limited in relation to the citizens of non-ratifying states. 
More concretely, the US continues to show itself ready and willing to bribe member 
states to derogate from their treaty obligations in relation to US citizens and inter-
ests, which places the very rationale of the ICC somewhat in doubt.71 The origin of 
each court project is now reviewed in order to orient, later in this discussion, the 
structure of each within its political environment. 
3 J The ICC of 1937 
The notion of an international criminal court or tribunal, for the prosecution of acts 
deemed by the world community to be international crimes, began to receive 
serious academic study during the 19th century.72 By 1919, public support rallied 
behind the victorious Allied powers to prosecute violations of the laws of war and 
humanity perpetrated largely by Germany during the First World War.73 A Com-
mission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement 
of Penalties suggested to the Paris Peace Conference74 that an ad hoc international 
tribunal, for the trial of certain 'acts which brought about the war and . . . particu-
larly the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg' should be 
convened.75 The Committee, in synopsis, concluded that 
[EJvery belligerent had by international law the power and authority to try 
individuals for war crimes but that an international tribunal was essential for 
71
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the trial of certain charges. These were charges of crimes against persons of 
varying nationalities, e.g., atrocities in prison camps containing prisoners of 
war of more than one nationality, charges against persons of authority whose 
orders affected more than one nationality or operations against the armies 
of more than one of the Allies, and charges against the major enemy author-
ities and against any other persons whom it might not be desirable to try in 
any national court.76 
Nothing came of this, but provision is made in article 227 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles77 to try the former German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm, for 'a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties'. A n Allied extradition 
request to the Netherlands, where he had fled, was refused on the grounds that the 
offence charged against him was unknown to Dutch law, was not mentioned in any 
treaties to which the Netherlands was a party, and appeared political.78 
Articles 228-230 of the Versailles Treaty provide for the prosecution of war 
criminals in Allied tribunals,79 and the Allies presented a 'wanted' list of 854 indi-
viduals on 3 February 1920. What trials took place, before the Supreme Court in 
Leipzig, proved unsatisfactory,80 yet the effort to prosecute German war crimes 
reinforced interest in an international criminal jurisdiction, and a centralised 
tribunal.81 A request by the Commission of Jurists to the league of Nations 
Assembly that same year, for a separate 'High Court of International Justice', was, 
however, not well received, largely because it included the question of state culpa-
bility.82 
In 1926, the International Law Association approved a draft 'Statute of the 
Court', action favoured by the International Association of Penal Law which 
adopted a resolution in support of an international criminal jurisdiction.83 The use 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice84 for this purpose posed a further 
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option.85 Then, the third political assassination of 1934,86 that of King Alexander I 
of Yugoslavia, occurred in Marseilles, on 9 October, during a state visit. The French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, M . Louis Barthou, was also killed, and approximately 
45 persons injured in the incident. The perpetrators belonged to an Croatian 
'Oustachi' organization, the ultimate aim of which was to sever Croatia from 
Yugoslavia, and unite it in a new Austro-Hungarian-Croatian state.87 
The extradition of persons accused of the Marseilles murders88 was refused by 
Italy on the ground that the crime was political; the accused were convicted 'par 
contumace\ or in absentia, in France.89 On 10 December 1934, the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, M . Laval, presented a draft proposal to the Council of the 
League of Nations in which he urged the adoption of 'international measures' to 
separate and suppress terrorist crimes committed for political purposes, and a 
criminal court in which to try the perpetrators.90 Thus, the creation of an inter-
national criminal court specifically for the suppression of 'terror' crimes marked a 
new direction within a more general context of international co-operation to 
suppress and prosecute 'crimes' of international concern. 
The League Council formed a Committee of Experts, with delegates from 
Belgium, Chile, the U K , France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Rumania, the USSR, 
Spain, and Switzerland, to prepare two draft conventions.91 The first draft texts 
were completed in April 1935.92 The final texts, negotiated 1-16 November 1937, 
were opened for signature at Geneva, on 16 November 1937. Both 
conventions had a status independent of the PCIJ and the League,93 despite 
being League initiatives, as the League was already in difficulty.94 Twenty-four 
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governments signed the Terrorism Convention,95 and thirteen governments, the 
ICC37.96 
It was hoped that additional competencies could in time be added.97 As one 
commentator remarked in 1935, '[i]t seems extraordinary that inasmuch as a crime 
is a crime in a country, yet when it comes on to the international plane it should 
remain unpunished'.98 The comment illustrates well the tradition of linking sover-
eign and territorial interests to the suppression and punishment of crime which 
would hold for much of the 20th century. Therefore, what was instead sought was 
a formal treaty basis to the 'universalised' exercise of jurisdiction over terrorist 
crimes of an international character, such as would result in punishment for the 
perpetrators, much in the same mamier as the jurisdiction exercised to punish acts 
of piracy on the high seas, or the belligerent suppression of war crimes. 
Approximately one year after the two terrorism projects came to fruition, the 
Second World War erupted. The decreasing restraint in the means and methods 
utilised to achieve victory effectively transformed what had been viewed as a 
positive international legal order of war law into a 'trial by arms', or *just war'. To 
the extent that natural law concepts implying enduring ethical values superior to 
individual state interests came into play the Second World War could be charac-
terised 'morally'.99 In turn, a natural law philosophy in the sense of such a 'higher 
law* was inserted into the charters for the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, 
providing some evidence of 'the existence, side by side with positive law, of a 
natural law which was binding on all States irrespective of their will '100 - in this case, 
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the prohibition of certain crimes of violence in international life.101 This facilitated 
not only a finding of individual criminal responsibility, but further, of punishment 
premised on specific formulations of the notionally pre-existing international 
'crimes' of aggression, of war, and against humanity.102 
Allegations of ex post facto law continued however to dog the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials in relation to the prosecution, by the 'victor" states, of those defeated 
for crimes against the peace, war crimes, the demise of the defence of superior 
orders, and crimes against humanity.103 The unconditional surrender, the Allied 
occupation, and the assumption of supreme authority over the German state by the 
four Occupying Powers permitted them to govern Germany, albeit in the name of 
the U N , in which, it was hoped, ultimate responsibility would inhere. Under these 
circumstances in particular, there could be no other courts in Germany than the 
investigatory and prosecutorial organs of the four powers.104 Nonetheless, jurisdic-
tion was defended by the Nuremberg Court, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative 
power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surren-
dered The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of 
the victorious nations,... it is the expression of international law existing at 
the time of its creation— The Signatory Powers created the Tribunal, 
denned the law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper 
conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of 
them might have done singly... .10S 
The foundation for the assertion that any of the Signatory Powers alone might have 
tried the defendants pursuant to prevailing laws and procedures is located in the 
Preamble to the Nuremberg Charter, which declares that the Allies were acting 'in 
the interests of all the United Nations', that the Indictment expresses the common 
position of the four Powers, and that the charter was intended as a precedent for 
future use. A n interface with reality is attempted by the equation between such laws 
and procedures, and the 'interests of all the United Nations' as determined by the 
US, the USSR, the U K , and France.105 As noted by van Hoof, the acceptance of 
101
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some superior authority in international law, such that the majority of states may 
bind the minority, is premised on a natural, rather than a positive, law philosophy.107 
The extraordinary conflagration of the Second World War, the unconditional sur-
render of Germany and Japan, and their territorial mihtary occupations certainly 
facilitated such a unified stance. 
33 The 'Rome' ICC 
As previously remarked in relation to both ICCs, there is a common thread: terror-
ism. In turn, acts which are, or can be, termed 'terrorist' occur alongside new 
theories of warfare and military necessity, and new developments in weaponry.108 
A n agreed definition of terrorism for purposes of universal jurisdiction is thus as 
problematic as the prohibition of developments in new war technologies and state-
sponsored terror-methods.109 A recognition of this point early in the renewed post-
Cold War negotiations thus resulted in a different approach taken to international 
crime in order to construct an international criminal forum, and a harmonised 
law.110 
Much earlier, however, and pursuant to U N General Assembly Resolution 
175(11), the U N Secretary-General was instructed to begin 'the necessary prepara-
tory work for the beginning of the activity of the International Law Commission'.111 
Specifically, and pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 260(III)B of 1948, the 
ILC was requested to: 
[S]tudy the desirability and possibility of establishing an international 
judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes 
over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international 
conventions. 
In carrying out this task, the ILC was to 'pay attention to the possibility of estab-
lishing a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice'.112 
On 3 March 1950, it was concluded in a report by I L C Special Rapporteur 
Ricardo J. Alfaro that it was both 'desirable and feasible to institute an inter-
national criminal jurisdiction for the prevention and punishment of international 
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crimes'.113 In contrast, I L C Special Rapporteur Emil Sandstrom, in a second report 
of the same date, came to the opposite conclusion, stating '[i]n my opinion the cons 
outweigh by far the pros'.114 In large part, his adverse opinion was premised on the 
perceived flaws of Nuremberg: 
With regard to the criticisms of the Nuremberg Trial, it can further be said 
that because of the haphazard way in which a permanent jurisdiction would 
be working and because of the impossibility of foreseeing the political 
events, there will be no guarantee against the same criticisms being raised 
against such a permanent jurisdiction.115 
The immediate post-war environment in this regard was thus one of uncertainty for 
many reasons, not the least of which centred on whether draft work for an inter-
national criminal court should precede, follow, or accompany the development of 
a penal code. Work continued on both projects. What was to become the Rome 
Statute of 1998, and the now quite separate Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind,116 initially were twinned, and drafts produced in 1951 and 
1953. However, the U N General Assembly tabled the Court project in 1954, until 
the 'Code' project could be finalised. Both the Draft Statute, and the 1954 'Draft 
Code',117 were then stalled until 'aggression' could be defined by the General 
Assembly.118 This occurred with Resolution 3314(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, but 
as that resolution was by consensus vote, 'aggression' remained a political concept, 
not a justiciable crime.1'9 
In 1990, the I L C was invited by the General Assembly, in Resolution 45/41 of 
28 November, to consider further the issues raised previously concerning the 
question of an international criminal jurisdiction, including the possibility of estab-
lishing an international criminal court or other international criminal trial mechan-
ism.120 With the end of the Cold War, various initiatives took on an added urgency 
in relation to the prosecution of war criminals, not the least of which have resulted 
in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, in 1993,121 
113
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Rwanda, and more recently. Sierra Leone. However, it was specifically acknow-
ledged, in the case of the ICTY, that: 
[T]he Security Council's decision in Resolution 808 (1993) to establish an 
international tribunal is circumscribed in scope and purpose The 
decision does not relate to the establishment of an international criminal 
jurisdiction in general nor to the creation of an international criminal court 
of a permanent nature, issues which are and remain under active consider-
ation by the I.L.C. and the General Assembly.122 
The 'chicken or egg' positioning of the court and code projects during much of the 
post-1945 era, and the uncertainty thereby occasioned, was ultimately resolved by 
separating them.123 I L C work on a Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court 
was submitted in 1994 to the General Assembly, with the recommendation that the 
latter convene an international conference to conclude a convention for the estab-
lishment of the court.124 
As regards harmonisation, the ILC comments, in relation to parallel work on 
the General Provisions of the Draft Code dealing, inter alia, with scope and appli-
cation, that, although the progressive development of international criminal law 
and of the direct applicability of international law with respect to individual 
responsibility and punishment for crimes under international law largely began with 
the Nuremberg Tribunal,125 any pre-existing agreement is found only in relation to 
the principle that crime must be punished: '[t]his is in accord with the precedent of 
punishment for a crime under customary international law or general principles of 
law as recognised in the Nuremberg Judgement.. .\126 In other words, it is only in 
relation to the principle that crime must be punished that any general agreement 
to co-ordinate international crime control is found which pre-dates Nuremberg, a 
conclusion fully reflected in the approach taken in the ICC 37. 
As for the jurisdiction of the ICC, a preliminary list of crimes included the 
Nuremberg offences - crimes against the peace (aggression), war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. The 1948 Genocide Convention was considered, as were inter-
national treaty crimes concerning terrorism.127 In relation to the latter, the ILC, in 
1993 commentary, could distinguish between international terrorist treaties. Those 
in which crime is denned, such as the 1979 International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages, permitted an international criminal court to apply basic treaty 
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law, created a system of universal jurisdiction, and anticipated an international 
criminal tribunal,128 while mere 'behavioural' crimes did not. By 1994, the I L C 
included 'treaty crimes' where the prohibited acts, when systematic and sustained, 
constituted crimes of serious international concern, both within criminal categories 
of general international law, and more special international law, such as the 
Genocide Convention.129 
By 1996, however, recommendations to include special crimes of international 
terrorism were dropped entirely, due largely to doctrinal disagreement in relation 
to the difficulty of distinguishing terrorism, per se, from the tactics of some wars of 
self-determination.130 Even though any distinction made in liberation theory 
between 'justifiable' and unjustifiable uses of violence mirrors that found in the laws 
of war between licit and illicit uses of armed force, it must remain a matter of specu-
lation whether specific terrorist offences, for example, those relating to civil 
aviation, will be added to the article 5 crimes through the amendment processes 
contemplated in ICC, articles 121 and 123, or whether the ICC's jurisdiction can be 
stretched to cover crimes of a terrorist nature. In any event, state diversity in the 
prosecution of individuals for crime persists, despite the over-arching, pre-Nurem-
berg principle that 'crime must be punished', as is now discussed. 
4 D I F F I C U L T I E S R A I S E D B Y T H E ' R O M E ' I C C 
4.1 US Opposition 
The ICC utilises both a vertical and a horizontal approach to the exercise of inter-
national jurisdiction essentially through a choice in case referral under article 13. 
Specifically, article 13(b) referrals by the U N Security Council can transcend state 
territoriality, and are thus horizontal. Article 13(c) Prosecutorial initiative is yet 
another horizontal extension. In contrast, as the ICC is based on 'complementar-
ity' in the context of state referrals under article 13(a), a universal scope to article 
5 crimes is established, rather than universal jurisdiction. This leaves intact the 
more traditional, vertical approach to international law, and reflects a continuing 
political unwillingness to conform individual socio-legal systems for such purposes, 
which in turn arguably places the desirability of a universalist approach to under-
lying concept in some doubt. 
A strong vertical approach to state sovereignty, in terms of enforcement capa-
bility, is also implicit in the U N Charter. Without the particular distribution of 
power and authority found in the U N Charter, it is even to be speculated the US 
138
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would not have joined, or been a founder of, the organization. A s was noted in 1947, 
'the makers of the United Nations-chief among which was the United States -
created a political rather than a legal system'.131 Specifically, at that time, it was not 
thought the Security Council would necessarily consult law in its handling of 
disputes,132 or would view international law as a yardstick regarding domestic ques-
tions for charter purposes.133 Accordingly, the US has expressed 'fundamental 
concern' with the horizontal reach of law designed into the ICC134 as a major shift 
in power politics.135 
In particular, one difficulty for the US is that if it wishes to stop an investigation 
and/or prosecution, it will be unable to do so through Security Council resolution 
unless it has the agreement of the other permanent members and four non-
permanent members. A decision by the Security Council to refer a case must be 
taken under chapter VII of the U N Charter, which, in accordance with charter 
article 27(3), requires 'an affirmative vote of nine members including the concur-
ring votes of the permanent members'.136 This gives each permanent member the 
veto power, even in situations involving itself.137 Therefore, a horizontal exercise 
of universal jurisdiction - in the sense of transcending the territoriality of a state 
party - by the Security Council over article 5 crimes can be blocked by one per-
manent member. Conversely, should the court be seized either by a state or through 
prosecutorial initiative, the proceedings can be blocked, as the Security Council, 
acting again under chapter VII, may defer an investigation or prosecution for 
twelve months, renewable. In the latter situation, however, and crucially, deferral 
must also comply with charter article 27(3). 
A further consequence of the court acting in article 13(a) cases involving the 
territory or citizens of ratifying states138 is an extension of international control over 
what are at present crimes defined within the political frameworks of domestic 
131
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criminal law. Specifically, the different interpretations afforded to, and enforcement 
of, domestic penal laws which have arisen from varied socio-political systems can 
now be superseded, even though it is certainly the case that the requirements for 
admissibility to investigate and/or prosecute before the court are stringent. In view 
of the harmonised approach to the elements of the article 5 crimes to be employed 
by the court, there will, in effect, be a superior global enforcement body for newly 
nominated international crimes: crimes against humanity unrelated to war,139 and 
aggression; crimes of war and genocide are already prohibited by treaty. 
The difficulty in such a shift is this. As implementation of the U N Charter is 
incomplete,140 international law is enforced vertically. In that the ICC is designed 
to act as a superior enforcement body, the resulting transfer of power from states 
to the court could result theoretically in the trial of citizens of non-ratifying states. 
For those states which have accepted the jurisdiction of the court, this was fore-
seeable; moreover, individual states already possess the sovereign right to proscribe 
certain conduct occurring in national territory. Nevertheless, the competence of 
what is now an additional forum, and the use of what might be termed 'new' law, 
constitutes the extension of a law-and-order approach to what was previously 
achievable, if at all, via political niters and considerations of international comity. 
The ICC could thus greatly disturb the existing distribution of power and authority 
originally designed into the United Nations Charter. 
Furthermore, by providing a degree of political distance from individual state 
responsibility for successful convictions pursuant to ICC, article 5, ratifying states 
have arguably gained a mechanism enabling them, albeit indirectly, to prosecute 
each other, or at the least, each other's policy decisions. While acceptance of the 
court's jurisdiction is tantamount to an acceptance of external interference in 
matters that used to be domestic, a legal approach to the perpetrators of article 5 
crimes side-steps allegations of international delinquency, for example, of state 
sponsorship.141 This minimises considerations other than a perpetrator's actus reus, 
although it will still be necessary to consider intent to gauge the significance and 
extent of any putative authority over the perpetration of a relevant crime. As for 
the traditional need to evaluate the probity of sister-state legal systems prior to a 
decision to extradite or prosecute an offender, the option of a referral under article 
13(a) necessitates less concern both for over-arching geo-political considerations, 
and cultural and ethical relativism. 
139
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Moreover, the maintenance of international peace traditionally has frequently 
depended upon the success of a balance maintained with the principle of non-inter-
ference in sister-state domestic affairs. This equilibrium is now at risk due to the 
separate, and superior, enforcement capability contemplated in the ICC.142 For 
example, heretofore, a desire to prevent damage to international relations has been 
paramount in much state decision-making regarding the prosecution of persons 
deemed international criminals.143 One consequence of this consideration, and of 
the enforcement of international law by states generally, is that protective inter-
national legal mechanisms traditionally have constituted mere auxiliary means to 
formalise the duties of states in relation to individuals. The consistent application 
of this structure in the post-1945 era, as evidenced positively through state agree-
ment and practice, is now in clanger of being overturned by the adoption of a multi-
lateral instrument which relies on a putatively superior Grundnorm^ 
Until adherence to the ICC becomes universal, the seeming simplicity of 
approach to harmonised law-making found in it cannot reflect the expression of 
existing international criminal law. While great strides have been made in the pro-
gressive development of international conventional law since the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, there remains a lack of much-needed critical foun-
dation to this new exercise in international scrutiny and accountability. In institut-
ing a court that will utilise a harmonised approach to the article 5 crimes, and, a 
'legal' crime of aggression in particular, a leaching away - via multilateral treaty -
has begun of the political discretion left to be exercised either by individual states 
acting in their sovereign capacity, or the Security Council. This, in the absence of 
express agreement through treaty ratification, could result in the imposition on 
unwilling states of legal standards which have not yet acquired the status of custom-
ary international law, itself a combination of opinio juris and state practice, as is 
now discussed. 
4.2 U N Charter Article 42-1/2? 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the ICC, article 5, crimes against 
humanity, and of war, genocide, and aggression form part of the law of the land, 
and hence, that states remain under a continuing obligation either to incorporate 
or transpose such prohibitions into their domestic policies and legal systems, there 
should be little hesitation, or difficulty, in pooling together sovereign control 
mechanisms into a superior enforcement capability. However, the potential for 
conflict between international and state-centric approaches to responsibility for 
international crime goes to the structural heart of the United Nations. 
i« Note the negative Preambular duty in the ICC: 'Emphasising . . . that nothing in this 
Statute shall be taken as authorising any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or 
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First, in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security under 
the U N Charter, the Security Council holds the primary responsibility for its 
restoration pursuant to charter article 24(1). Charter article 39 states '[t]he Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression.. . ' in relation to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. Such threats, breaches or acts may occur in times of war, as well as 
those of notional peace. As remarked earlier, determinations under article 39 are 
inherently political in nature. 
The original intent behind charter article 42 was to make directly enforceable 
any armed measures agreed by the Security Council pursuant to a determination 
under article 39 to restore international peace and security.145 Articles 43-50 were 
designed to make concrete the Security Council's ability to do this. However, direct 
action by the Security Council under article 42 has never been possible, as the 
necessary military agreements envisaged in article 43, for the maintenance of stable 
aimed forces, have never been forged. The main difficulty has hinged on disagree-
ment among the five permanent members of the Security Council as to the specific 
contributions of each.146 While this lack of agreement may in large part be attribu-
table to the Cold War, it can equally be understood on the basis that a fixed hier-
archy of military responsibility would have emerged among the five permanent 
members which otherwise were to operate on lines of equality. 
Thus, regardless of opposing political ideologies, charter article 43 was infused 
with an inherently political aspect from the start, rather than the purely technical 
character which should have prevailed. As such, the Security Council is unable to 
order states to participate in armed enforcement measures authorised under article 
42 to restore international peace and security. In turn, states not wishing to become 
militarily involved in U N activities taken under article 42 need not. In this connec-
tion, Gioia notes: 
Under Charter Article 106, which was to apply 'pending the coming into 
force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43', the parties to the 
Four-Nation declaration, signed at Moscow on 30 October 1943, plus France, 
were empowered to 'consult with one another and as occasion requires with 
other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on 
145
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behalf of the Organisation as may be necessary for the purpose of main-
taining international peace and security'. Be the present status of this pro-
vision as it may, there would be no duty on the part of U .N . Members to join 
in military action undertaken by the five Powers 'on behalf of the Organis-
ation'.147 
Therefore, in relation to the armed preservation or restoration of international 
peace and security, there is no right to call on states to act, nor is there any positive 
state duty so to act148 The Security Council is unable by right to require states to 
utilise force to prevent the occurrence or continuation of situations in which the 
nominated article 5 crimes against humanity, and of war, genocide and aggression 
occur. There is instead only a power to request assistance, which states remain at 
liberty to reject In turn, the existence of a power, rather than a right/duty corre-
lation, fully reflects the lack of means available at present to enforce 'legal' deter-
minations for these purposes. A s such, Security Council determinations under 
article 39 remain inherently political. In this respect, international law remains a 
primitive legal system, and the sovereign independence of states, a basic feature of 
international society. 
Nor has any determination, judicial or otherwise, been made that customary 
international law has emerged such as would imply a right/duty correlation in 
relation to U N direct armed intervention to prevent the occurrence of article 5 
crimes.149 As noted by van Hoof,150 one of the most fundamental aspects of the 
international law-making process is that 'the consent of states has to be regarded 
as the constitutive element of rules of international law'. In relation to the develop-
ment of law through multilateral treaty, only accepting states are bound.151 Custom, 
on the other hand, requires sufficient evidence that states accept they are bound by 
a principle. While 'consent' can be evidenced in various ways, the fact remains that 
an intention to be bound by legal rules must be manifest. In other words, the 
consent of states cannot be assumed, but must be made obvious through state 
practice, in the sense of demonstrating a legal obligation so to act. To argue that 
147
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either consent or practice alone is sufficient to create customary international law 
is to ignore the importance of one of its requisite components.152 
Therefore, if no right/duty correlation exists in international law directly to stop 
or prevent a situation in which one or more of the ICC, article 5, offences is occur-
ring, then the seizing of an international forum with enforcement capability for the 
prosecution of individuals alleged to have perpetrated such offences in a system-
atic manner is missing a critical foundation in customary international law. The con-
currence of state consent and practice in creating a hierarchy of norms in 
international law, or a recognition of norms that are of fundamental importance for 
the international community, must be present before a responsibility to maintain 
those norms systematically can be viewed as grounded in custom. Thus, while the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals gave recognition to an international law of indi-
vidual responsibility in relation to the perpetration of violent acts, also highlighted 
are the serious difficulties created by the 'web of connection' existing between indi-
vidual responsibility and that of groups, including nations and states, regarding the 
use of force. 
Foregrounded is the enduring distinction found in criminal law theory in 
relation to the element of intent. 'Legal' determinations of guilt made pursuant to 
ICC, article 5, are in respect of individuals over whom custody can be obtained; 
the ICC constitutes a superior enforcement mechanism to prosecute only those 
individuals who can be captured.153 Given the obvious dangers of opportunistic 
admissibility, and of ratification only by what are at the time of writing fewer than 
half of the world's states, it cannot be said there is sufficient evidence of consensus 
to substantiate the 'creation' of a truly autonomous, consistent, body of inter-
national criminal law. On the contrary, one is reminded less of mighty winds than 
of smoke-filled rooms. The politicisation of the court must be anticipated, as must 
be the law to be applied by it. 
4.3 Nullum crimen sine lege? 
While there are no direct enforcement duties in international relations, it cannot be 
said that there is no existing law in relation to the ICC, article 5, offences. As dis-
cussed earlier, two of the article 5 offences - war crimes and genocide - already find 
expression in international jurisdiction through treaty. Individual crimes against 
humanity are locatable within different human rights documents, and aggression 
remains undefined in law. The difficulty, as noted by Bassiouni,154 is as follows: 
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Universal jurisdiction resembles a checkerboard. Some conventions recog-
nise it and some national practices of states demonstrate its existence, but it 
is uneven and inconsistent. Most of all, the practice of states does not 
evidence its consistent or widespread application. 
One reason for such inconsistency in practice is that the four article 5 offences 
concern systematic or large-scale behaviour perpetrated during times of war and 
peace, as well as by state and non-state actors. A strict approach to crime is thus 
adopted which risks ignoring political variations in-built over time through indi-
vidual state implementation; for example, state approaches to the three offences 
already attracting legal recognition vary in relation to whether the perpetrators are 
made amenable to state systems of public order, or engage any immunity rules. To 
equate what is essentially an unquestioned moral authority with a legal one is as 
misguided as any presumption of equivalence between principle and implemen-
tation. Accordingly, a distinction between universal condemnation, at one end of 
the political spectrum, and universal jurisdiction, at the other, is upheld through a 
corresponding distinction between prescriptive, and enforcement, jurisdiction. 
States ratifying the ICC 37, in conjunction with the Terrorism Convention, 
would have utilised both a common legal approach to terrorist offences, and their 
own substantive law. The present ICC takes the opposite approach, in that there 
would appear to be little in the way of a common state approach to the article 5 
offences, yet the substantive law to be applied before the court is potentially made 
applicable to anyone. The differentiation in the assertion of jurisdiction, on the one 
hand, pursuant to article 13(a), and on the other, article 13(b), cotifirms the 
distinctions inherent in the distribution of power contained in the U N Charter. 
However, the basis for jurisdiction found in article 13(c) represents a new depar-
ture from the pre-existing balance of power. Given that the Rome Statute is reliant 
on an 'autonomous' international legal community, so-called, yet is notionally 
binding only on ratifying states, any assumed consensus in relation to 'global' 
accountability for crime must be viewed as wildly exaggerated, not least because 
the US opposes, in particular, the possibility of state-actor prosecutions.155 As 
noted by Bassiouni:*5* 
[I]t is easier for states to recognise and apply the theory of universality and 
other enforcement modalities to [individuals and small groups], than to do 
so with respect to those who carry out state policy. This explains why, not-
withstanding the extensive harm caused by genocide and crimes against 
humanity, states have been reluctant to have the same enforcement obli-
gations apply as they have provided, for example, with respect to 
'terrorism'and international drug trafficking. It is this writer's contention 
[that] international criminal law conventions whose subjects are those 
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persons engaging in state action or carrying out state policy contain 
less effective enforcement mechanisms than other similar international 
conventions. 
While the ICC 37 would also have linked territory and sovereignty to terrorist 
offenders, with the associated potential io try official actors of non-ratifying states, 
it must remain a matter of speculation whether this would ever have occurred.157 
Gaps exist in the state prohibition of crimes afforded universal jurisdiction to 
the extent that sovereign discretion to implement international rules in accordance 
with perceived needs exists. As a result, many states continue to require a linkage 
between their exercise of criminal jurisdiction and nationality or territory. There-
fore, not only does the fact of prosecution differ state-to-state,158 but such trials as 
are held are subject to different laws, procedures, and interpretations; there is no 
customary international law or procedural treaty to conform internationally the 
instigation or outcome of such actions. In turn, to allege the existence of a notional 
unitary norm in existing patterns of co-operation invites instead a search for 
deviance from it, such as to reveal dissonance in relation to issues of content, and 
hence, of concept, concerning international crimes, not the least of which would, 
no doubt, involve the degree to which each of them is even amenable to legal defi-
nition. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The ICCs of 1937 and 1998 differ far more than they resemble. On the one hand, 
the 1937 codifications required states to prosecute and punish particular terrorist 
acts of an international character. Otherwise, ratifying states would have retained 
their powers of sovereign control. The present ICC, in contrast, facilitates a transfer 
of substantive competence from sovereign states to an international forum, to pros-
ecute 'serious' article 5 offences. Conventions for the organization of two inter-
national criminal courts have thus been opened for signature and ratification in the 
20th century, and it is certainly to be hoped that the latter convention enjoys a more 
mature response from the international community than did the former. 
Perhaps the time has arrived for the world community to proscribe, strictly, the 
perpetration of certain acts. In particular, a legal definition for the crime of aggres-
sion would 'make international self-defence legally meaningful'.159 The non-entry 
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into force of the 1937 treaties was certainly affected by the rapid approach of a 
world war fought for divergent ideologies,1*0 and in a manner which depended as 
much on those ideologies as on new technology. It therefore needs remembering 
that the Terrorism Convention and ICC 37 were worthy, if failed, attempts to deal 
collectively with a major cause of international friction: acts of politically-motivated 
terrorism of an international character, which, unfortunately, can be supported and 
financed by state and non-state actors alike. 
No attempt was made in the ICC 37 to develop a substantive international 
criminal law. Complicating this picture, the prosecution of politically-motivated 
actors can prove particularly objectionable to a government sympathetic with a 
terrorist's political motivation, or which maintains traditions of asylum. However 
politically relevant such objections may remain today concerning 'the most serious 
crimes' of genocide, of war, against humanity, and of aggression, it is nonetheless 
the case that the failure to achieve co-operation in 1937 regarding the suppression 
of terrorism is but one indication of the degree to which many state and non-stale 
actors prefer not to confront a genre of criminal acts they are themselves prepared 
to utilise. 
Notwithstanding the above, it remains the case that customary international law 
requires sufficient evidence of state consent and practice for its positive identifi-
cation. Otherwise, developments in international law are subject to treaty, such that 
only consenting states are bound. To assert that a legal standard is binding on states 
without evidence of custom or treaty participation is tantamount to constructing a 
hierarchy within what otherwise is a system built on sovereign equality. While it is 
true that the prohibition on the use of force in international relations 'should' 
restrain any state's enforcement, or breach, of post-1945 customary international 
law, it remains the case that disagreement as to content and concept remain. Absent 
the use of superior force, or a coalition of the willing, there is no enforcement 
mechanism in existence with which directly to prevent atrocities perpetrated 
systematically by individuals. Whether or not a superior legal enforcement mechan-
ism such as the ICC can possibly succeed within what is inherently a political 
environment remains to be seen. 
See, e.g., speech by Mussolini on 7 October 1934, in which he attributes only two 
alternatives to the 'irrevocable decline of the capitalist civilisation: the Communist and the 
corporative'. Keesings Archives, 1393. 
